Authority and Consent: Politics, Power, and Plunder in Charleston, South Carolina, 1700-1745 by Woytonik, Kristen Ann
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
2011 
Authority and Consent: Politics, Power, and Plunder in Charleston, 
South Carolina, 1700-1745 
Kristen Ann Woytonik 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the United States History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Woytonik, Kristen Ann, "Authority and Consent: Politics, Power, and Plunder in Charleston, South Carolina, 
1700-1745" (2011). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539626651. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-5j2a-9a17 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
Authority and Consent: Politics, Power, and Plunder in Charleston, South
Carolina, 1700-1745
Kristen Ann Woytonik 
Skokie, Illinois
Bachelor of Arts, Smith College, 2008
A Thesis presented to the Graduate Faculty 
of the College of William and Mary in Candidacy for the Degree of
Master of Arts
Department of History
The College of William and Mary 
May 2011
APPROVAL PAGE
This Thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Krisren Ann Woytonik
ApprovedbyThe Committee, May, 2011
" » \pd|primttet^Chair 
Assistant Professor Brett Rushforth, History
The College of William and Mary
Professor Kris Lane, History 
The College of William and Mary
Professor Scott Nelson, History 
The College of William and Mary
ABSTRACT PAGE
This localized study of privateering and piracy in Charleston, South Carolina betw een 1720 
and 1755 offers an  interpretation of th e se  activities a s  an extension of a growing d isconnect 
betw een the colonial residents and the vice admiralty court. In the wake of earlier pirate 
crises, local officials banded together with the imperial authorities to prosecute offenders and 
p ass  restrictive legislation. W hen that relationship deteriorated, colonial officials turned a  blind 
eye to residen ts violating declaration and condem nation laws. T h ese  actions, illegal under the 
law but permitted by local governm ent, indicate the em ergence of a  legal grey zone and a 
discrepancy betw een the authority vested  by the Crown and the authority a s  recognized by the 
colonists. P erh ap s even more important than the newfound quasi-legal supply of hard 
currency to the  cash-strapped  colony w as the tension surrounding competing authorities a s  the 
C harleston m erchant and planter bloc drifted further, socially and politically, from the  Crown's 
appointed officials.
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1Introduction: The Politics of Plunder
On June 22, 1745, three South Carolina men gathered to draft a deed of gift.
An indentured servant-tumed-privateer summoned a local justice of the peace and a 
lawyer to help him exchange plunder for his freedom. The justice sealed the 
document, the mistress emerged richer in coin, and the indentured entrepreneur was a 
free man.
These exchanges were common in Charleston during the 1740s. Their legality 
was at best ambiguous. All three parties’ actions could have been called into question 
by imperial authority. Had the servant followed proper procedure in declaring the 
plunder? The answer, certainly not. Was the mistress remiss in accepting the 
plunder? According to the law, yes. Did the justice have the authority to seal and 
declare the gift valid? This question has no clear answer, and it perhaps the most 
interesting.
A historian making the case for increased scrutiny of historical crime declared 
that “because crime is a behavioral phenomenon which comes to the historian’s 
attention only after proscription and prosecution, the history of crime is not simply 
social history but an important component of legal history.”1 But what of crime that is 
not so easily defined, behavior considered illegal by some and socially acceptable by 
others? When this type of action occurs in a place and time where law is in flux, can it 
be considered a crime?
1 Robert P. Weiss, ed., Social History o f  Crime, Policing, and Punishment. (Famham: Ashgate 
Publishing, 1999), 309.
2These three men chose to follow a common law, a social precedent of legality 
set not by legislation but by the inaction of local officials in prosecuting their 
transgression. Secure in their agreement, they put it forth in a legal document, which 
made its way from a justice of the peace’s ledger to a folder at the South Carolina 
Department of Archives and History. Historians now have evidence of their “crime”, 
and it is more a political phenomenon than a behavioral one.
The history of maritime activity, and especially its illegal element, cannot be 
fixed in a time or space. As a result, it is difficult to explain, understand, and even 
contextualize maritime crime and piracy. Efforts to bring piracy into the discussion of 
the Atlantic World broadly take two forms. One group of scholars treats piracy as an 
interesting anomaly and focuses on the so-called Golden Age of Piracy, which lasted 
from 1650 to 1720 with an especially virulent upswing in activity in the last decade in 
the Caribbean, along the North American coast, and across the Atlantic to West Africa 
and the Barbary Coast. Conflict between England, France, Spain, Portugal, and 
Holland led to a great number of privateers operating in the Atlantic; when the powers 
achieved peace and revoked the letters of marque, many of the privateers continued to 
run their operations despite their illegality. With peacetime came unemployment for 
naval men, and the skilled sailors proved attractive recruits for pirate crews. These 
historians portray piracy as a phenomenon embedded in international conflict, a side 
effect of the struggle for supremacy.2
2 The following three works are useful in their attention to the rise o f piracy in an international context. 
Peter R. Galvin, Patterns o f Pillage: A Geography o f Caribbean-based Piracy in Spanish America,
3The second approach to the study of pirates in this time period focuses on the 
social history of mariners and their trade. This vein of scholarship, advanced recently 
by Marcus Rediker, suggests an image of the pirate crew as an amalgam of 
downtrodden, oppressed people which function as a proletariat through piracy. The 
pirate ship provided a refuge where men with low socioeconomic mobility could 
achieve influence, and the democratically-run pirate crews stood in opposition to 
imperial, aristocratic rule. While these works provide a much-needed societal 
contextualization of piracy, the focus on the internal dynamics of the crew comes at 
the expense of the larger effect of near-continuous piracy in the Atlantic. Both 
approaches ignore post-Golden Age piracy and the era’s impact on the colonial 
response to privateering and piracy.3
Both groups of scholars view piracy as a reaction to larger social and political 
forces, a critical component to understanding the trends of when, where, and why 
piracy occurred. Whether the pirate is a privateer gone rogue or a protester, he (and it 
is always a he, save for a few unusual instances) is committing an illegal act. The 
post-Golden Age period complicates the question of legality, and the very definition of 
crime.
1536-1718 (New York: Peter Land, 1990); Mark Gillies Hanna, The Pirate Nest: The impact o f piracy 
on Newport, Rhode Island and Charles Town, South Carolina, 1670—1730. Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard 
University, 2006, esp. ch. 8; Mark Quintanilla, "The World of Alexander Campbell: An Eighteenth- 
Century Grenadian Planter," Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies 35, no. 2 
(Summer, 2003): 229-256.
3 Stephen D. Behrendt, David Eltis, and David Richardson, "The Costs o f Coercion: African Agency in 
the Pre-Modem Atlantic World." The Economic History Review 54, no. 3 (Aug., 2001): 454-476, esp. 
460-64; Linda Colley, "Going Native, Telling Tales: Captivity, Collaborations and Empire." Past and 
Present no. 168 (Aug., 2000): 170-193.
4A major issue in the historical examination of piracy is periodization. Scholars 
focusing on the Golden Age end their studies in the 1720s, while those interested in 
piracy in the context of international war are bounded by the dates of the conflict. 
Piracy, privateering, and especially the role of booty in legal proceedings and in the 
economic sphere require a continuum of study. Many of the social and legal changes 
which facilitated piratical activity in the 1740s began during the Golden Age and 
shifted in favor of the rogue seamen over the course of the interwar decades. Finally, 
officials’ tolerance of overtly or subtly illegal maritime activity depended on public 
opinion. The political and social climate of Charleston at midcentury is most 
revealing when compared to the preceding decades. In looking at piracy, privateering, 
and public opinion over the first half of the eighteenth century in Charleston, a story of 
political competition between local officials, the vice admiralty court, and the alleged 
criminals emerges.
Robert C. Ritchie identified two types of piracy within the English empire. 
Officially sanctioned piracy “comprises acts that are clearly piratical under any system 
of law but that go unpunished because a particular government finds it convenient to 
ignore such activities”, while commercial piracy is either associated with merchants or 
“with communities that practiced piracy as a major economic enterprise.”4 The latter 
definition clearly applies to Charleston. This paper will demonstrate that the first 
definition is also applicable, because the relevant “particular government” is the local 
administration, and not the imperial satellite vice admiralty court.
4 Robert C. Ritchie, Captain Kidd and the War Against the Pirates (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1986),! 1, 17.
5This paper is divided into two sections. The first deals with the Charleston 
colonists’ public opinion of the government and its relationship with privateering and 
piracy between 1680 and 1725, when tensions between local and imperial authority 
were put aside in favor of collaboration against the pirates. Continuing anxiety over 
economic and social instability, ineffectual government and an inadequate legal 
system provide the context for the second section, an examination of why and how 
plunder trade opened again in Charleston after the 1720s crackdown, and the reasons 
for increased local support of plunder in defiance of the vice admiralty court. 
Economic, legal, and social pressures developed in parallel fashion between 1720 and 
1755, which in turn fueled outwardly oppositional attitudes of Charleston residents 
toward the vice admiralty. By 1740, pirates were no longer the enemy, and behavior 
which sparked outrage and vigilantism in the 1710s was deemed necessary for the 
economic survival of the colony.
When public sentiment and English law and its enforcement arm diverged, a 
legal grey zone invited enterprising colonists to use the disjointed system to their 
political and economic advantage. What the vice admiralty court considered a crime, 
colonial officials called legal, and the Charleston residents called everyday business.
6Chapter One: Fear, Power, and the Legacy of the Golden Age in Charleston
(
Privateering and piracy, for all of the strongly-worded laws governing them by 
England, were not adjudicated uniformly in terms of the practice of law. Even when 
mariners engaged in obvious illegal activity, social circumstances often saved them 
from the gallows. In the North American colonies, English authorities and colonial 
officials tolerated piracy when the seamen also acted as paramilitary units against 
foreign powers or delivered rare goods, and openly supported privateering against 
enemies in times of war. Some colonial officials also consciously ignored the 
formation of pirates’ nests in port cities and looked the other way as pirates and 
citizens brokered trade of undeclared plunder. When the populace supported the 
pirates’ work, most were safe to continue extralegal business.5
Their safety depended on both general support from the public and either an 
overt or implicit acceptance by the crown. The judgments of the two entities could 
align in the pirates’ favor or diverge to dangerous repercussions. A change in public 
opinion proved problematic for the pirates at the beginning of the eighteenth century. 
In the years leading up to the crackdown in the 1720s, colonists grew concerned that 
piracy, and associated maritime instability, threatened shipping and the development 
of the coastal economy. The administrators were forced into action in a more extreme 
fashion than before. Officials had to create economic and legal incentives for 
townspeople to break ties with the pirates, and apply social pressures to bring in the
5 Ritchie, Captain Kidd, 146-151; Marcus Rediker, Villains o f  All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the 
Golden Age (London: Verso, 2004), 28-29.
7pirates themselves. When the popular and legal opinions reflected each other, colonial 
officials could carry out effective anticrime schemes. But even once the legality of 
piracy was no longer in flux, the authorities and residents of South Carolina still had to 
navigate the complicated relationship between their political system, a new economic 
system, and the multiple definitions of crime in play.
The colony of South Carolina had a particularly tumultuous relationship with 
pirates, due in part to a rocky political foundation and troubling economic conditions 
in its early years. South Carolina, in contrast to its immediate northern Chesapeake 
neighbors or southern sugar-producing Caribbean islands, floundered quickly under a 
failing proprietorship less than two decades after its inception. One scholar noted that 
“the Carolina proprietors in the early 1680’s confronted the problem of a colony that 
returned neither profits nor obedience to its owners.”6 The colonists in turn were 
skeptical of the proprietors’ ability to manage the colony. Colonial policy suffered the 
effects of internal factionalism between pro-proprietary English and Scots immigrants 
and anti-proprietary Barbadian transplants. Colonists and investors alike were 
continually worried by the lack of steady profit.
Tensions between England and Spain boiled over in 1686 with an invasion of
troops into the Carolinas from Spanish Florida. The proprietors dispatched a new
governor, James Colleton, with whom local officials refused to cooperate. The desires
*
of the proprietors and the demands of the crown were in opposition to popular opinion,
6 M. Eugene Sirmans, “Politics in Colonial South Carolina: the Failure of Proprietary Reform, 1682- 
1694,” The William and Mary Quarterly 3d series (Jan., 1966): 33.
especially on the issues of suppressing pirate and Indian trades which had taken hold 
in the colony and were generally viewed favorably. Some colonists believed that 
Colleton overstepped the power afforded to him in the charter by banning the trades, 
and when Colleton refused to recall the divided parliament in 1687, rhetoric of 
tyrannical government rapidly spread. The Glorious Revolution provided the basis for 
a series of more conservative uprisings: the colonists wanted to regain political power 
in the current system, rather than establish a new political order. The result, for South 
Carolina, was the expulsion of Colleton and an uneasy relationship between the 
colonists, their local officials, and the proprietors for the following three decades.7
Official policy on the suppression of piracy shifted from rapid trials and 
executions, as under Colleton in the 1680s, to tactics designed to promote long-term 
stability. The War of Spanish Succession produced a glut of privateers, encouraged 
and licensed by Queen Anne. But the war left the seaboard with a significant 
lingering problem: many of the once-legitimate privateers turned pirate after the 
Peace of Utrecht in 1713. The mass of unemployed sailors drove down wages paid by 
merchants for shiphands, and competition rose even for the lowest paying jobs. The 
privateers, turned out by the Royal Navy and disappointed by the conditions on 
merchants vessels, continued to plunder the triangular trade shipping routes between 
the Caribbean and the North American mainland, taking advantage of newly-obtained
7 Thomas Cooper, ed. Statutes at Large o f  South Carolina. Vol. II (Columbia, S. C.: A. S. Johnston, 
1837), 45.
9Spanish markets through the terms of the asiento, a British monopoly of the slave
o
trade to previously-closed Spanish markets in the wake of the Treaty of Utrecht.
Pardons issued to pirates after 1717 were designed to absorb as many 
renegades back into society as possible. To this end the pardon procedure included a 
provision that permitted reformed pirates to keep their treasure if they freely 
renounced their prior rogue ways. British officials believed they could lure pirates 
away from their volatile and dangerous profession with the promise of the ability to 
settle down in the colonies with their ‘savings.’ A preventative measure directed 
towards seamen accompanied this policy. The crown approved a sliding scale of 
reward payments for bounty hunters bringing pirates back to mainland North America. 
British encouragement of pirate hunting proved to be both a profitable opportunity for 
industrious sailors and a safeguard against straight men turning to piracy. It was more 
lucrative to work against the pirates than to become one.9
England viewed its responsibility to act against pirates as part of a global 
effort. That piracy occurred on the seas and negatively influenced trade between 
nations only slightly complicated the question of authority in the eyes of the vice 
admiralty. “And the King of England hath not only an Empire and Sovereignty over 
the British Sea, but also an undoubted Jurisdiction and Power, in concurrency with
8 Kris E. Lane, Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas, 1500-1750. (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. 
Shaipe, Inc., 1998), 172.
9 Philip Gosse, The History o f  Piracy {New York: Tudor, 1934), 316-24; Hanna, “The Pirate Nest”, 
289-321.
10
other Princes and States” to prosecute pirates, even “in the most remote Parts of the 
World.”10
The English law’s specific definition of piracy also alluded to flexible 
jurisdiction. The description of crimes considered piracy was straightforward, but an 
important element of the definition was the location of the criminal activity. In order 
to be considered piracy, the criminal act had to be “committed in or upon the Sea, or in 
any other Haven, River, Creek, or Place where the Admiral or Admirals have or 
pretend to have Power, Authority, or Jurisdiction.”11 Piratical activity in or around 
English territories was a matter for England, and Parliament held hostage the right of 
localities to operate trials against pirates. Colonial officials had to petition to try 
pirates; when the petition was granted, strict instructions and trial procedures had to be 
followed.
Piracy was almost always considered as a capital offense by the jury. A 1718 
description of trial procedures for piracy even condones vigilantism, stating that “in 
our Law they are terms Brutes, and Beasts of Prey; and that it is lawful for any one 
that takes them, if they cannot with safety to themselves bring them under some 
Government to be tried, to put them to Death.”12 In the event that the captors did hand 
the alleged pirates over to the government alive, the judge of the vice admiralty court 
commissioned a grand jury to hear evidence on the charges. Once an indictment was
10 Tryals o f  Major Stede Bonnet and Other Pirate. (London: Benjamin Crowse, 1719), xi.
11 South Carolina Court o f Vice-Admiralty, “Oct 30, 1718”, Records o f the South Carolina Court o f  
Admirality 1716-1732. Parts 1-2, AB (London, 1719).
12 T. B. Howell, A Complete Collection o f State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other 
Crimes and Misdemeanors from the Earliest Period to the Year 1783 (London: T. C; Hansard, 1816), 
1235.
11
issued, the vice-admiralty court conducted a trial, often for a group of alleged pirates . 
The court first acknowledged witnesses supporting the case against the defendants. 
Any of the sitting members of the court could question the witnesses, after which the 
accused were afforded the opportunity to question their accusers. Then, the court 
directly questioned each alleged pirate.
Most of the alleged pirates denied either direct criminal activity or knowledge 
of the piracy, or claimed the pirates forced them aboard by threat of death or slavery. 
Sometimes this strategy was successful, but only when supported by the Judge and the 
Attorney General. More often, claims of ignorance fell on deaf ears, as evidenced by . 
this exchange between prisoner Thomas Carman and the Court.
Carman. As for what I did on board Capt. Thatch, I was forced, but when I 
came to North Carolina, I would not have went on board, but Maj. Bonnet 
shewed me the Act of Grace: and when I enter’d myself on board, it was to get 
my Bread, I hopes to have went where I might have had Business; for when we 
left Topsail-Inlet, I had not signed the Articles.
Ignatius Pell [witness for the King’s Evidence]. But you gave the Captain 
your work that you would.
Carman. When I was left in the Sloop, I endeavoured to make my escape with 
the Sloop.
Judge Trott. So, I find you wanted a Vessel of your own.
Carman. No, but to have got from them: but I could not.
Attorney General. This confirms what the King’s Evidence proves against 
them.13
13 Tryals o f  Major Stede Bonnet and Other Pirates, 16. In another installment o f the trial, the Jury found 
Thomas Gerrard not guilty o f piracy after both a hostage and Judge Trott claimed “he was threaten’d to 
be made a slave of; tho indeed he [had] better been made a slave than go a pirating”, and that he was 
“faithful to his King and Country.” Jonathan Clarke and Rowland Sharpe also make successful claims 
o f innocence supported by the Attorney General because “none o f the Evidence proves that he shared 
any o f the Goods” the pirates stole; 31.
Thomas Carman and the seven other men tried along with him were condemned for 
piracy in the second installment of South Carolina’s most famous piracy trial. Though 
Stede Bonnet and his partner Edward Thatch, better known colloquially as 
Blackbeard, later became figureheads of the Golden Age of Piracy in North America, 
the particular connection between the two pirates and the port of Charleston proved 
more important in the development of legal rhetoric and public memory surrounding 
piracy.
Thatch and Bonnet, aside from assembling a flotilla under the black flag and 
assuming a troubling presence for merchant vessels between South Carolina and 
Barbados, had in 1718 delivered an assault on Charleston in the form of a hostage 
crisis. As one eyewitness reported, after taking “five Prizes” off the bar of Charleston, 
the pirates devised a plan to “dispose of the Vessels and Prisoners and being then in 
want of Medicines, they resolved to demand a Chest from the Government, and detain 
them till they were sent.” The pirates blockaded the Charleston harbor and sent one 
hostage, Mr. Marks, and two representatives of the pirate crew to make an application 
to the governor. The governor initially refused, upon which “the Pirates had 
unanimously resolved to murder all the Prisoners, and bum their Prizes” in the harbor. 
“The Pirates being too strong to cope with at the Time”, the governor acquiesced to 
the pirates’ request for medicine, after which the pirates “hurried the Prisoners to their 
Vessels the next Day, and made sail from this Coast.” Officials found the event so 
bold and offensive that the Attorney General made a special plea in his opening
13
remarks for the Grand Jury to consider that “the Inhabitants of this Province have of 
late, to their great Cost and Damages, felt the Evil of Piracy”, and further claimed that 
the extortion by the pirates “was putting the Province under Contribution.”14
People in Charleston believed that instability attracted pirates, and many found 
fault with the proprietors for the state of the province. A 1720 letter from an unknown 
source implored the Crown to take over the colony, listing a number of social 
grievances the author believed to be linked. South Carolina was under siege from 
“negroes rising with a designe to destroy all the white people in the country and then 
to take the towne”, “an increase dayly in slaves but decrease in white men”, men 
“killed by the Indians to the Southward”, and with little protection, the author 
expected they “shall now have more pyrates than ever.” He speculated that if the 
colony came under royal direction, “doubtless Carolina will thrive again”, but under 
the supervision of the proprietors “many of the best and richest inhabitants will leave 
the country.”15
Another letter directly linked the government to the pirates, and indicates a 
growing worry among colonists that official support of piracy might topple the 
colonial economy and political structure. In a letter to the King, the Assembly of 
South Carolina reported on the inability of the proprietors to govern. Specifically, the 
authors expressed concern that the government proved incapable of protecting the 
colonists because the officials were directly involved in facilitating violent events.
14 Tryals o f Major Stede Bonnet, 3-4.
15 Letter to Mr. Boone, June 24, 1720, sec. 125, in Cecil Headlam, ed., Calendar o f  State Papers, 
Colonial Series, America and West Indies 1720-1721 (afterwards noted CSPCS), 57-58.
14
They indicted the government of North Carolina for allowing Thatch to commit 
“several acts of piracy there in the very face of that Government”, noting that “several 
parcels of pyratical goods were found in their govemours and secretarys custody.”
The proprietors of South Carolina, according to the letter, did nothing to get rid of the 
pirate nest (as opposed to Virginia governor Alexander Spottswood), but “abandoned 
the Government to evil Ministers and exposed us [the colonists] to ye ravages of most 
barbarous enemys” which included not only pirates, but Indians and Spanish forces.16
The aftermath of Thatch’s execution and the crew’s trials was more than a 
lingering public memory. The incident exposed critical weaknesses in the colony’s 
ability to protect itself, and the trial demonstrated the willingness of both South 
Carolina officials and the vice admiralty to put an end to piracy. Legal and procedural 
changes reflected the greater need for a hard line on piratical activity. Perhaps the 
largest departure from previous attempts to control piracy came in the form of an
. J
internal cleansing of ties to pirates and their goods. The pirate trade the South 
Carolina colonists had fought to protect against Colleton was threatening stability as 
colonists conspired with pirates to obtain goods at the expense of their shipping 
industry. Governors in the continental colonies asked the crown for proclamations 
permitting them to try both pirates and those colluding with pirates. In 1721 
Parliament responded with a stronger bill to suppress piracy by holding accessories to 
piracy criminally responsible. The definition of an accessory was broad and included 
such activities as “trading with known pirates, or furnishing them with stores or
16 Petition o f the Council and Assembly o f the Settlements in South Carolina to the King, Feb. 2, 1720, 
CSPCS 1720-1721, 333-337.
15
ammunition, or fitting out any vessel for that purpose, or in any wise consulting, 
combining, confederating, or corresponding with them.” Any of these charges could 
result in a trial, with the colluder labeled a “pirate felon and robber.”
The new laws and corresponding enforcement proved effective in reducing 
piracy in the Caribbean and off the mainland coast through the 1720s. The effort was 
sustained by the support of “clergymen, royal officials, and publicists who sought 
through sermons, proclamations, pamphlets, and the newspaper press to create an 
image of the pirate that would legitimate his extermination.”18 The widespread 
piratical activity off the North American coast became a problem shared by the 
entirety of the colonies through systematic reprinting of pirate encounters. Some of 
the articles depicted pirate attacks as almost inevitable, stressing the degree to which 
pirate vessels effectively controlled high areas of trade traffic. One example detailed 
the immense loss of cargo due to pirates. The article quoted a letter from an agent in 
Kingston, Jamaica to a merchant in Charleston, noting that a snow which “had on 
board for the Merchants of this Place, a great quantity of Goods, and considerable 
parcels of Silver” was among “not less than six Sail of Vessels taken” by pirates as 
they were “going to and coming from said Island [Jamaica].” The article notes that 
the pirates intercepted “a considerable quantity of Silver” which was to be used to
17 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws o f England, IV (New York: W. E. Dean, 1832), 51; 
Gosse, History o f Piracy, 316. A brief discussion o f the interplay between British, French, and Spanish 
policies on privateering and piracy can be found in Anthony McFarlane, The British in the Americas, 
1480-1815 (London: Longman, 1994), 128-132.
18 Rediker, Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, 285.
16
“purchase a load of Rice” from Charleston, one of South Carolina’s most important 
commodities.19
The newspaper accounts also portrayed the piratical activity as a direct and 
calculated assault on individuals, the colonies, and the crown. In the wake of Edward 
Thatch’s patrol of the coast, The Boston News-Letter printed the story of William 
Wyer, captain of Protestant Caesar, a trading vessel which was overtaken by Thatch 
and his crew in the notorious Queen Anne’s Revenge. Wyer’s crew was so fearful of 
the pirates that they refused to fight and handed over the ship; in a meeting with Wyer, 
Thatch allegedly said he “was glad that he [Wyer] left his Ship, else his Men on Board 
his Sloop would have done him Damage for fighting with them” before adding that he 
“would bum his Ship because she belonged to Boston, adding he would bum all 
Vessels belong to New England for Executing the six Pirates at Boston.”20 Thus the 
Blackbeard incident became the trope of the Golden Age of piracy in South Carolina; 
the pirates, the collaborators, and permissive governors became the enemies of the 
colony and empire, and the upstanding officials, Royal Navy, and law-abiding colonist 
their heroes.
Despite both the colonial government’s and the vice admiralty’s commitment 
to eradicating the pirate problem and reordering the charter after the departure of the 
proprietors between 1715 and 1720, peace did not always exist between the bodies. In 
1723 the Privy Council responded to reports of “ill treatment” of the Judge of the Vice
19 “Charlestown, South-Carolina, Feb. 19”, New England Weekly Journal, Mar. 20, 1732, 2.
20 The Boston News-Letter, issue 693, Jul. 15,1717,2.
17
Admiralty by Francis Nicholson, the governor, who also ignored the court’s 
jurisdiction. The Privy Council demanded that “orders be sent to all Governors of 
Plantations that at their Perrils they do not themselves Molest, or interrupt the Judges 
and other Officers of the respective vice admiraltys”, but instead they should “do use 
their utmost to Encourage and Support the aforesaid officers.. .in the Just and legall 
Execution of their Duty.” The Privy Council concluded by stating that most of the 
problems warranting complaint by the colonists fell under the jurisdiction of the vice
n  t
admiralty.
The British officials were also concerned with what they identified as an 
independent spirit in South Carolina. On August 5, 1724 Governor Nicholson wrote a 
report to the Council of Trade and Plantations full of complaints against the colonists 
and their political conduct. According to Nicholson, he “found that the Lower House 
have very strangely acted (and in my humble opinion like Common Wealth men)
i
assuming to make resolutions without the consent of H.M Honble. Council or myself 
nay even without advice and with submission to your Lords”, and the colonists were 
“insisting on their old privilidges as they call it in ye Proprietours’ time some of which 
I think very inconsistent with the King’s Government.”22 Nicholson’s account of the 
colonists’ dissatisfaction with imperial intervention in their governmental proceedings 
suggests that while the colonists had been anxious and insistent in getting rid of the
21 Acts o f the Privy Council o f England Vol III (London: Authority o f the Lords Commissioners, 1966), 
57-58.
22 Governor Nicholson to the Council o f Trade and Plantations, Aug. 5, 1724, CSPCS1724-1725, 198.
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proprietorship, they were not fully prepared to accept the realities of operating in a 
royal colony.
Even with the Privy Council’s decision to uphold the power of the vice 
admiralty in spite of complaints, the relationship between the vice admiralty, 
Charleston residents, and perpetrators of maritime crime remained complicated. The 
unifying moment of the piracy crackdown was gone, and a system of conditional 
permission and convoluted social attitudes toward privateering, piracy, and plunder 
replaced it. The Navy could not afford to stop the practice of privateering in wartime, 
even at the risk of another destructive rise of piracy. Similarly, the Charleston 
blockade was not the representative experience of the relationship between South 
Carolinians and pirates -  the colonists had opposed Colleton’s bullion ban not two 
decades before. The needs of the pirates were not always in direct contrast to the 
needs of the colonists; often, the pirates helped support the local economy with hard 
currency, and the colonists kept the pirates provisioned at port. Thus for all three 
groups, the space between the law and the demands of reality was sometimes changing 
and often contested.
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Chapter Two: Coin, Councilors, and Courts in Political Contest
The British first made legal provisions for vice admiralty courts in South 
Carolina in 1696. One early act required all vessels exchanging goods in colonial 
ports to carry a valid register. Two individuals were responsible for inspecting 
registers and noting cargo: a naval officer affiliated with the vice-admiralty, and a 
collector, appointed by local officials. Both were required to submit reports to the 
custom commissioners in London, and both parties’ signatures were required in the 
secretary’s book. This arrangement became the norm for officials dealing with the 
enforcement of port regulations. Parliament handed down the law, the colonial 
officials oversaw the law’s application, the vice admiralty court was in place for 
enforcement, and some combination of crown appointees and local selectmen 
determined who would go before the court, and who would not.23
At the turn of the century, colonial officials and the vice admiralty focused 
together on eradicating the pirate problem, and the presence of the Royal Navy 
warships, which patrolled the coast, gave the vice admiralty court a boost of power. 
The colonists welcomed the presence of the warships, a visible sign of security. If the 
colonial officials were mostly under the thumb of the crown, the official appointees’ 
influence was dwarfed by the empowered and popular court. After the boom in piracy
23 Steven L. Snell, Courts o f Admiralty and the Common Law: Origins o f the American Experiment in 
Concurrent Jurisdiction. (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2007), 143-147.
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trials in the 1720s, mechanisms for controlling and apprehending pirates shifted back 
toward crown-approved pardons.
English law made specific prescriptions for jurisprudence in the colonies. The 
colonial legal system relied on two overarching concepts: repugnancy and divergence. 
Colonial statutes could diverge from English law to accommodate unique needs, but 
the colony’s laws must be in the spirit of, and in no way repugnant to, English law. 
This idea was built into the very foundations of the colonies, and their laws. The 1629 
patent for Carolina dictates that the laws should “be consonant to reason and not 
repugnant or contrary, but (so far as conveniently may be) agreeable”, and the 1663 
charter had nearly identical language.24 The repugnancy and divergence principles 
were significant because their codification resulted in the legal acknowledgment of 
distinct colonial needs. In turn, that provision empowered colonial officials to develop 
a legal system instead of directly transplanting an existing one. Over the first half of 
the eighteenth century, colonists’ understanding of how the law should be applied 
grew more complicated; even when the laws were not repugnant to those of England, 
colonists’ reaction to legal constraints, especially in the case of booty, often were.
Plunder must be considered as an element of Charleston’s economy. Not only 
did Charleston’s long history with piracy leave room for plunder trade, bullion played 
a divisive financial and political role in South Carolina affairs. Immediately following 
the piracy crackdown, South Carolina experienced economic growth which promoted
24 Mary Sarah Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2004), 215.
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financial and political organization around a plantation production and shipping
»
distribution system. The rise of plantations and Charleston’s booming shipping power 
impacted the relationship between the colonists and various governing boards. With 
the 1720 takeover of the colony by Britain from the failed proprietorship, the Board of 
Trade assumed control of the South Carolina council. These councilors were 
responsible for local governance, as well as maintaining correspondence with London. 
The council consisted of twelve men, all appointed, to be drawn from the suggestions 
of the governor and the Board’s knowledge of the candidates’ social and moral 
standing. The first appointees were placemen, lawyers, and visiting investors from 
London, with two thirds being staunch supporters of the rebellion and one third being 
proprietary holdovers. The Board hoped that allowing representation for the factions 
would create a council better suited to dealing with the aftermath of the power 
transfer.
Immediately the council challenged issues of jurisdiction in the colony. In his
)
1721 report, Francis Yonge, clerk of the Council of South Carolina, told the Council 
of Trade and Plantations that much of the council’s time had “been taken up in 
disputes and settling the Custom House and Court of Admty. Affairs, that the Acts of 
Trade may be duely observed” in order to avoid both courts from “setting up an 
independant jurisdiction and power from that of the Government.” Yonge then
22
credited Governor Nicholson with “a perfect tranquility owing to ye prudent
9 <administration” in the colony.
The planters and merchants amassed great political capital relatively quickly. 
The most powerful planter families had ties to each other by blood and marriage, and 
supplied a large number of colonial officials, including multiple governors. The 
merchant elites were familiar to the Board of Trade by their business relationships 
with London partners and investors. In the second round of selections, the Board 
acknowledged the local influence of these groups by replacing the outgoing investors 
and placemen largely with merchants and planters. The Board invested power and 
relative independence to its selections, the most prominent, and often the most wealthy 
men of the colony.
The South Carolina council only continued to gain local power and prestige 
through the 1720s. The governors deferred to the council, and in one case the council 
was illicitly permitted to elect its own president and select replacement councilors 
without gubernatorial oversight. The Board of Trade, at once obsessed and unable to 
deal with rising factionalism on the subject of currency, made several critical missteps 
in handling the paper money debates in the 1720s. First siding with a strict anti- 
emission hard money faction, the Board came under fire from pro-paper and more 
moderate members of the provincial government. Producers and factors railed against 
the Board’s refusal to make any headway in alleviating the currency shortage.
25 Francis Yonge to the Council o f Trade and Plantations, Oct 28, 1721, CSPCS1721 sec. 702, pg. 479.
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The colonial government took matters into their own hands. In November of 
1729 Benjamin Whitaker wrote a letter to the Council of Trade and Plantations to 
report on new developments in the currency crisis. Whitaker alleged that Arthur 
Middleton, the president of South Carolina, “contrary to the express orders of his late 
Majesty”, had “issues 30,000 in paper bills of credit (which by law ought to have been 
sunk) whereby the value of the said bills are greatly lessed; and the training people of 
Great Britain much injured.” Whitaker expressed corlcem for the province more 
generally, stating that “H.M. subjects in Carolina have to fear from a state of anarchy 
and confusion to which they are now very near reduc’d”, a condition only worsened 
by Middleton’s “diverse.. .acts highly injurious to H.M. prerogative.”26
Losing the battle on both paper money and the authority over it, the Board 
reversed position in 1729 and lent support to a moderate pro-emission council 
plurality. The Board then removed the reactionary hard money faction and the radical 
paper money advocates from the council. Though many colonists supported the 1729 
decision on currency, the subsequent ousting of the political opponents left some 
deeply nervous of the Board’s political designs on local government.
By 1730, the constant clash of the currency debates and the rise of local 
production and distribution provided the local government, the merchants and the 
planters, with considerable power. The provincial government was designed to relay 
English law to the colonists. This worked when the local government was either under 
the thumb or in agreement with those giving the orders from London. Throughout the
26 Benjamin Whitaker to the Council o f Trade and Plantations, Nov. 13, 1729, CSPCS1729, 240-241.
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1730s, those requirements grew less applicable to the situation in South Carolina, and 
especially in Charleston. The planters and merchants’ concerns revolved around the 
tangible needs of the colony. The Board of Trade’s policy switch on currency 
emission demonstrated the power of the planter and merchant bloc. The vice 
admiralty had a similarly tenuous relationship with local authorities. The piracy 
crackdown had worked only because the officials delivered the pirates to the court. 
Local authorities needed approval of England’s institutions in order to enforce their 
policy, but the enforcing institutions were dependent on the authorities for support and
97compliance.
The relationship began to unravel in the 1730s. As acknowledged by scholars 
of the earlier period, Charleston had a set of unique issues that impacted public 
response to the law. The ongoing threat of Spanish, French, and Native American 
attack put colonists on the defensive, desperately trying to prove their loyalty to the 
crown and their commitment to stabilizing the colony. The colonists, for all their 
effort, were not pleased with the support they received from the imperial bodies in 
South Carolina. The continued ineffectualness of the Lords Proprietors and a 
growing, disgruntled upper-middle class left a legacy of political struggle in the 
southern shipping center.
During the decline in piracy in the 1720s, Charleston was a mid-sized town 
with a population of roughly 3,000. Still, Charleston handled virtually all trade in
27 Mary Sarah Bilder provides definitions and context for the competing legal approaches o f repugnancy 
and divergence in Rhode Island in Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution, 40-42.
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South Carolina’s cash crops through a system of contracting.28 Charleston merchants 
acted as middlemen between the plantation owners producing rice and the British 
buyers. South Carolina’s cash crop economy and British trade policies left the colony 
completely dependent on importation for manufactured items. It then follows that 
preserving the budding economic prosperity of Charleston, and the import-export 
pattern that supported the colony, was a priority of officials and colonists alike. 
Merchants involved in the export trade flocked to the port to collect contracts for rice 
and indigo. Charleston merchants also oversaw the steadily increasing import trade, 
though it was at their own risk. Merchants both extended and operated under lines of
9 0credit in a colony notorious for difficult debt-collecting.
The lack of colonial merchant authority in the trade illuminates how heavily 
reliant South Carolina was on England, not only for dry goods, but also for direct 
investment and trade governance. As Britain strengthened a monopoly in South 
Carolina’s manufacture import trade, British merchants transferred more fiscal 
responsibility on the local merchants. Factors in South Carolina received goods on 
long-term credit, which was especially critical for those engaged in the slave trade, 
and they accrued large debts to London capital providers.
This was sustainable so long as trade was reliable. The tipping point came 
when the effects of the 1720s separation of dry goods and staple trade diverted
28 R. C. Nash, “The Organization o f Trade and Finance in the Atlantic Economy: Britain and South 
Carolina, 1670-1775” in Money, Trade, and Power: The Evolution o f Colonial South Carolina’s 
Plantation System, Jack P. Greene, Rosemary Brana-Shute, and Randy J. Sparks, eds. (Columbia, S.C.: 
University o f South Carolina Press, 2001), 74-107.
29 Ibid., 85.
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commodity dealing from London to other ports. Export merchants no longer enjoyed 
credit exchanges with London, and the shift resulted in the English merchants being 
freed from their financial obligations. Instead, the South Carolina agents of English 
merchants had to come up with the resources to finance the trade. Heavily burdened, 
the Charleston factors attempted to guarantee some of their expenses by extracting 
bills of exchange from planters, which appears to have functioned for a time as an 
informal credit exchange. But by the end of the 1730s many planters, contractors and 
import factors were severely indebted to London, and to each other. When commodity 
prices collapsed in 1739 at the outbreak of the War of Austrian Succession, all groups 
fell under tremendous pressure to inflate prices, continue shipping, and most 
importantly, avoid crumbling under the debt.
An important social issue in South Carolina further tested Charleston residents’ 
trust in British governance. Slavery was long prevalent in the colony, but the urban 
slavery of Charleston was a specialized system. White residents of the town 
fluctuated between strong confidence and uneasiness. Charleston slavery was primary 
rent-seeking; slaves were trained in a skill, then hired out for the financial benefit of 
the master. But Charleston was not geographically far from the large-scale 
agricultural slavery so characteristic of southern plantations. Early laws on the subject 
provided little more than a definition of slavery, which stipulated that those of African 
descent and Native Americans could be made slaves for life and their children would
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be bom into slavery. As the slave population increased with the success of labor- 
intensive rice, so too did the debates on legislation for the slave society.
Ongoing marronage and insurrection in the Caribbean concerned South
Carolinians. They were well aware of the 1733 revolt on Danish St. John, in which
slaves overtook and held estates in the northern part of the island for several months
until French ships from Martinique put down the rebellion. In those months, planter
families fled to neighboring St. Thomas and also to St. Croix. The 1733 revolt was a
tme attempt at a takeover: slaves murdered white families, then took possession of the
fields with the hope of reviving production. That the slaves sought to capture and run
plantations heightened fear in Charleston’s surrounding rice regions. Slave
conspiracies unveiled in Antigua and the Bahamas provided more evidence of the
^  1
potential danger slaves might possess to South Carolina.
The Jamaican situation exposed another, more insidious danger. Since the 
institution of slavery on the island, maroon communities established in the forested 
hills of the island attracted mnaways. The maroons, still dependent on plantations for 
goods, raided nearby farms and houses, and white planters accused them of 
encouraging mass runaway attempts. The communities bordering the maroon 
settlements implored the local officials to disperse the maroons. The First Maroon 
War began in 1731, but the British had little luck in finding and fighting the maroons.
30 Peter H. Wood, Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono 
Rebellion (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), 196-200.
31 David Barry Gaspar, Bondsmen and Rebels: a Study o f  Master-Slave Relations in Antigua. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); David Barry Gaspar, “The Antigua Slave 
Conspiracy o f 1736: A Case Study o f the Origins o f Collective Resistance,” William and Mary 
Quarterly 3rd ser., 35 no. 2 (Apr. 1978): 308-323.
28
Conflict continued until 1739, when the Captain General negotiated a treaty with the 
maroons. The terms of the treaty granted acreage and freedom to the maroons in 
exchange for their work as bounty hunters of runaway slaves. The treaty served the 
needs of the community, which no longer feared theft of goods and slaves by the 
maroons. The Jamaican Council wrote an open letter, published in Boston and then 
reprinted, declaring that the “the Council of Island of Jamaica, do with the utmost 
Satisfaction congratulate your Excellency upon the late successful Expedition against 
the Negroes in Rebellion, and the Treaty so happily concluded with them.”32
In South Carolina, where permanent marronage had never taken hold but 
remained a perceived threat among white residents, the crown’s willingness to accept 
a treaty which guaranteed rebellious runaway slaves their freedom was no matter for 
celebration. In granting the maroons freedom, the Jamaican governor had essentially 
taken property from the citizens. More seriously, the military expedition against the 
maroons had failed, and instead of eliminating the maroon threat, the government 
pacified the runaways by gifting land. Finally, the treaty usurped local control of the 
slave population. The British saw the maroons as guerilla fighters; South Carolinians 
saw them as someone’s incorrigible missing property. As South Carolina slaveholders 
debated how to handle the volume of slaves attempting to run to St. Augustine, the 
Maroon Treaty dealt a blow to their confidence in British assistance in regulating the 
matter.
32Kenneth M. Bilby, True-Born Maroons (Gainesville: University o f Florida Press, 2008); “Behalf o f 
the Inhabitants of the Island o f Jamaica”, Boston Evening Post. June 11, 1739, 1.
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In 1739, a slave insurrection at Stono brought home to Charleston what has 
been described as “a decade of slave unrest throughout the New World plantation 
complex.” On the ninth of September, a group of twenty slaves staged an uprising 
roughly twenty miles from Charleston. The active revolt lasted 48 hours, at the end of 
which forty whites and most of the slaves involved were dead, but the event had 
enormous ramifications in the legal arena. What Philip D. Morgan observed as 
“oscillat[ion] between protracted stretches of near-complacency and brief spasms of 
paranoia” at the threat of insurrection turned to proactive legislation in the wake of 
Stono.33
Charleston’s citizens were long locked in vigorous debates over who 
controlled slaves, masters or the government. The populace had for decades been split 
on matter of the Security Act, which required white men to carry guns on Sunday to 
police slave activity during free hours. The issue of slaves forming cabals while their 
masters were in church was one of substantial discussion since the mid 1720s, but the 
law had never been consistently enforced due to widespread opposition: South 
Carolinians balked at a law which allowed others to police their slaves and demanded 
their action. After Stono, the 1740 Negro Act strengthened the existing Security Act, 
but in further regulating slave movements and activity the Act diminished the power 
of the master. Slaves were to be supervised during travel and work, and were 
forbidden to learn to write or carry weapons. Masters were no longer permitted to 
manumit their slaves. Only the government could approve manumission. This change
33 Philip D. Morgan, Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and 
Lowcountry (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 239.
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meant that in order to secure freedom, a slave had to run away and disappear, petition 
the government, or arrange to purchase their freedom, which was upheld through 
deeds of gift.34
From an urban slave’s perspective, restricted manumission dealt a large blow 
to their work system. Masters often permitted urban slaves to keep a portion of their 
wages, or if not, to hire themselves out on their free time. In some cases urban slavery 
resembled indenture, with the master willing to negotiate freedom in exchange for a 
number of years or amount of income earned. Urban slaves had access to goods and 
money, and under some circumstances such a slave could hope to save enough money 
to purchase his or his family’s freedom. If the slaves could not travel alone or work 
unsupervised, their ability to make their own income decreased substantially. Under 
these new laws, an opportunity for freedom through privateering emerged.
Within Charleston, many slaves had skills that were useful aboard a ship, and 
some were routinely hired out as shiphands on merchant vessels. This was a 
particularly lucrative situation for a master, since merchants often paid a lump sum for 
the labor of a slave sailor.35 The slave couldn’t hope to see much personal profit for 
working on the merchant vessel, but during wartime, when crews turned privateers, a 
slave might see one prize that could afford him his freedom.
For those with an acknowledged claim to a prize, booty or future plunder was a 
viable commodity in the economy. Prior to 1740, informal credit exchanges were
34 Wood, Black Majority, 103.
35W. Jeffrey Bolster, Blackjacks: African American Seamen in the Age o f Sail (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1997), 20, 138.
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standard procedure for many colonists to guarantee some of their cargo or cover 
overhead costs of outfitting ships. In a common style of power of attorney document, 
mariner Francis Surley appointed “Joseph Shute of Charles Town in the Province 
Aforesaid Merchant to be our true and Lawfull Agent & Attorney for us & in our 
behalf to do & transact all Matters & things” related to their venture. What made this 
document out of the ordinary was the fact that Surley named Shute the beneficiary of 
any “Lawfull Prize” they captured.
The word “prize” usually referred to a captured ship, while cargo items fell 
under the inclusive term “plunder”. This distinction is present in testimonies and 
deeds from Charleston. In an affidavit dated March 4, 1745, Captain William Dunbar 
reported “a Spanish ship Bahama & Esperance lately seized and taken on the High
'xnSeas as lawfull prize”. The remainder of the affidavit contains Dunbar’s testimony 
that the Spanish ship intended to take his sloop of war as a prize and his crew 
responded to the attack -  a self-defense argument which protected Dunbar and his 
crew against allegation of piracy.
By the 1740s the late Golden Age hysteria over piracy had dulled, but the War 
of Austrian Succession created a political situation that from the ocean resembled the 
War of the Spanish Succession three decades earlier. Merchants, sailors, servants, and 
debtors took to the sea on their own accord in hopes of turning a profit. The mariners 
of Charleston had long contended with the threat of French and Spanish hostility in the
36 Surley, Francis. Power o f Attorney Contract. June 29, 1745. South Carolina Department o f Archives 
and History (afterwards noted as SCDAH), Columbia S. C.
37 Affidavit o f William Dunbar, Mar. 4, 1745. SCDAH.
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Caribbean. Though historians cannot determine the individual motivations for 
knowingly breaking the law to “go on the account” in the 1740s, Charleston’s 
documents provide two insights into how maritime crime affected the city. Mariners 
intended to and did use plundered goods to reduce their debt and in some cases win 
their freedom from bondage. Secondly, the presence of records of prize and plunder 
in court documents indicate that the colonial authorities were recognized or even
' I Q
tolerated these men’s use of plunder outside the bounds of the vice admiralty court.
During times of war, British officials openly encouraged the plundering of 
enemies. This was no less true for the Austrian conflict as it had been in the War of 
Spanish Succession, but the economic situation of the colonies created divides in 
policy and a heightened sense of desperation in Charleston. A period of serious 
depreciation ended in 1731, and concerns in the legislature over economic tensions 
with Britain led to a currency act, passed in 1736, which called for the balancing of the 
account with Britain and a limit on the circulation of paper money. In an attempt to 
encourage use of specie, the legislature approved a discount on import duties.
Colonial merchants expressed concerns over the prevalence of paper notes, but the 
Board of Trade refused to grant petitions for an increase in paper money, due to fears 
of another round of depreciation.
38 Deposition of John Schermerhome regarding a Standoff with a Spanish ship, Aug. 23, 1745. SCDAH.
39 Richard M. Jellison, “Antecedents o f the South Carolina Currency Acts of 1736 and 1746”, The 
William and Mary Quarterly 3rd series (Oct., 1959), 556-67. This article details the struggle between 
colonial merchants who advocated for paper money and the crown’s concerns over securing debt 
payments. Kenneth Morgan, “The Organization of the Colonial American Rice Trade”, The William 
and Mary Quarterly 3rd series (Jul., 1995), 433-52, esp. 445. Morgan focuses on the impact o f specie 
on trade, specifically the crises stemming from credit refusals.
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Responding to the boom in privateering, the Privy Council sent uniform 
instructions to the governors of their colonies to streamline procedures. In September 
of 1741 the governors received “an Alteration in the Instructions formerly given to the 
said Governors concerning the Colours to be worn by all Ships to whom the said 
Governors shall grant Private Commissions or Letters of Marque or Reprizal”, the 
point of which was to “make the same conformable to those given by his Majesty’s 
Commissioners.” A 1745 addendum forbade “Men of War or Privateers ransoming 
prisoners or ships” and included instructions for the governors to “see that all 
Privateers send their Journals regularly to the Secretary of the Admiralty.”40
By regulating privateers and mainstreaming policies throughout the colonies, 
the Admiralty hoped to avoid a repeat of the post-War of Spanish Succession piracy 
epidemic. The Admiralty also wished to strengthen condemnation procedures in the 
vice admiralty courts. With increased regulation of privateering came concerns of 
authoritarian abuse. Two observable forms of resistance to the vice admiralty court 
policies emerged. Firstly, the colonists worked within the legal system to challenge 
jurisdiction and interpretation of the laws. In doing so, they used appeals to the Privy 
Council and political maneuvering within their own governmental bodies to try and 
reduce the vice admiralty court’s power. The second method of resistance could be 
termed non-participation in vice admiralty court proceedings. Here, the colonists 
simply bypassed the entire condemnation process. These methods were mutually 
reinforcing. The colonial officials could challenge the vice admiralty court in the legal
40 Acts o f  the Privy Council o f England Vol. Ill, 814.
realm because they had the support of the populace, and individual colonists could 
engage in non-participation because the officials were complicit in their resistance.
South Carolina’s colonists worried that the vice admiralty was manipulating 
legislation for its own favor at the expense of the, privateers. A report in the Commons 
Journal makes note of a petition filed by Thomas Frankland on behalf of the captors of 
the French ship La Conception. The privateers followed procedure for the 
condemnation of La Conception, which “together with her Guns, Tackle, Furniture 
and Apparel, and also the Moneys, Effects and other Things taken and seized In her” 
was processed as a “lawful Prize” by the vice admiralty court. The inventory of the 
ship included cocoa nuts and raw animal hides, two items which warranted a duty. 41
Frankland argued that the law was intended to permit the collection of duties 
on cocoa or hides “imported in a mercantile Way” as opposed to that obtained as a 
prize. In submitting his petition, Frankland implored “his Excellency and their 
Honours.. .to explain the Intention of the aforesaid Act”. Frankland included a 
charged suggestion, that if prizes were subject to duty, “then for the Encouragement of 
Capors of Prizes to bring them into this Port the said Duties may be remitted”.42
In addition to suspicion over the vice admiralty court’s enforcement of import 
duties, colonists clashed with the court again on the matter of service fees. The South 
Carolina House of Commons decided to press the issue of authority over vice 
admiralty court fees by appointing a council to review the law and ask for
41 South Carolina General Assembly, The Journal o f the Commons House o f Assembly, Nov. 14, 1751- 
Oct. 7, 1752 (Columbia, S. C.: Historical Commission o f South Carolina, 1951), 300.
42 Ibid.
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clarification. The council had two goals, “to enquire whether any Act hath been made 
by the Parliament of Great Britain for ascertaining the Fees of the Judge and other 
Officers of the Court of Vice Admiralty with respect to the condemnation of Prizes”, 
and “consider and report to the House some effectual Method for reducing the 
exorbitant Fees which are taken by that Court in this Province.”43 Unfortunately for 
those hoping the Assembly might wrest control of the fee scale, the committee 
invoked the repugnancy principle in concluding that “an Act of Parliament concerning 
the condemnation of Prizes ought to be a Rule to the Court of Vice Admiralty in this 
Province, and that no Act of the General Assembly of this Province ought to operate
• «44against it.
At times the conflict with the vice admiralty court had a very direct impact on 
the everyday lives of Charleston residents. As late as 1746 the court conducted 
business in a private home of a Charleston resident. Thomas Blythe submitted a 
petition to either recoup costs exceeding the one hundred pounds allotted to him 
yearly or have the court’s proceedings moved to another location altogether. Blythe 
claimed that he was “put to great Inconvenience” for having to provide multiple rooms 
and candles for the evening meetings of three separate courts.45
Unable to influence the fees, the location, or the economic agenda of the vice 
admiralty court through legal means, some colonists opted to employ a different 
strategy of influence: ignoring the court and navigating alternative paths to securing
43 South Carolina General Assembly, The Journal o f  the Commons House o f Assembly, Nov. 21, 1752- 
Sep. 6, 1754 (Columbia, S. C.: Historical Commission o f South Carolina, 1989), 24.
44 Ibid., 37.
45 Ibid., 74
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and using booty. This option was especially appealing given the economic clime. 
Specie from prizes was necessary to combat the staggering debt of the colony, and the 
Charleston merchants were often at the bottom of the debt chain.
The poorer mariners and factors were indebted to Charleston merchants and 
contractors, but their lenders were also indebted to capital firms in London. When 
London firms pressured colonial lenders for payments, the lenders desperately 
attempted to collect from the factors. Unable to produce coinage, mariners began to 
include their lenders as beneficiaries in their wills or including promissory notes, and 
the term “Merchant Attorney” is prevalent in deeds, signifying that local lenders 
served as executors and held powers of attorney.46
Because the status of a debtor and lender brought informal agreements into the 
formal legal arena, officials used deeds to open new avenues of securing or pursuing 
money, be it legally obtained or otherwise. In a bond signed in Jamaica and sent to 
Charleston for affirmation, James Ramadge guaranteed that if “10 pounds and 17 
pounds of Jamaica money are in fact not paid by the said Captain Gordon to the said 
Dallas as the same are charged then I will pay or cause to be paid to the sum of 27 
pounds money of Jamaica” to settle a dispute between John Gordon, captain of 
Ramadge’s schooner, and Robert Dallas and Joseph Whitfield over the capture of a 
prize ship. Instead of bringing the matter before the vice admiralty court for a
46 Power o f Attorney document o f John Ferguson, Oct. 25,1742. SCDAH.
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decision, Ramadge chose to mediate and relied upon the justice of the peace to make 
the agreement legally binding.47
Some seamen with plunder could not afford to take chances with the vice 
admiralty court because more than a bit of money was at stake. Another effect of 
increased plunder trade was the use of booty as, or in lieu of, valued goods in the 
colonial economy. In the 1745 case of Thomas Jolly, the indentured servant of Joseph 
Robinson, freedom would elude him if he could not maintain possession of the 
plunder. Jolly was put to work as a foremastman on a snow bound for the Caribbean; 
the snow engaged in a privateering expedition off of Jamaica. Upon his return, Jolly 
found that his master had died, and decided to offer his share of the loot from French 
prizes to Robinson’s widow in exchange for release from his indenture. In a deed of 
gift Jolly reported that “for consideration of the said Joan Robinson cancelling and 
Delivering up to me the said Thomas Jolly the herein before indenture” he would pay 
the remainder of his term with “the French ships and their loading and cargoes and my 
Share and portion of the Money arising by and from”.48 Joan Robinson accepted the 
offer and Jolly was released from servitude. Going on the account afforded Jolly the 
savings he needed to purchase his freedom, and utilizing allied colonial officials to 
make the exchange guaranteed the transaction.
Thomas Jolly’s ability to buy his indenture reflects a shift in attitudes towards 
labor in the 1740s. By this period virtually all willing indentures, as Jolly was, were
47 Bond issued by John Ramadge in Kingston Parish, Jamaica. Aug. 20, 1748. SCDAH.
48 Deed of Gift from Thomas Jolly to Joan Robinson. Jun. 22, 1745. SCDAH.
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skilled workers from England serving indentures of four to six years upon arrival in 
the colonies. This development is markedly different than the indentured servitude of 
the previous century, which involved mainly unskilled workers employed in 
agricultural labor who could be held in extended sentences. It is also reflective of 
Charleston’s urban, rent-seeking system of indentured and slave labor, where laborers 
were hired out by their masters for money. Jolly fit the portrait of the average mariner 
of the day: poor, possessing enough skills for his master to hire him out but deprived 
of the opportunity to purchase his freedom directly. Jolly was able to take advantage 
of a system that had a tradition of equating indentured labor with money, but only 
because he chose to make arrangements for his freedom in the quasi-legal grey zone. 
Jolly reappears in the colonial records once again after securing his freedom, when he 
submitted a petition for a land-grant in nearby Colleton County.49 Thomas Jolly 
arrived in South Carolina a bound servant and died a landholder.
Slaves working the ship decks took advantage of the opportunities afforded by 
privateering. One such man was Benjamin Elden. Elden was a black man of 
ambiguous status aboard a vessel called the Pearl out of Charleston, when Spanish 
privateers took him captive off the coast of St. Augustine. Elden, along with Robert 
Pratt and William Maxwell, escaped to Port Royal, where Pratt and Maxwell gave 
testimony to the Justice of the Peace that Elden had helped them survive the ordeal 
and gave their word he was a free man. The Justice of the Peace issued a statement to 
the governor and Judge of the Vice Admiralty, declaring that “Benjamin Eldin [sic] a
49 Plat for 100 Acres to Thomas Jolly, Sep. 30, 1768, SCDAH.
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Negro Man is a Free Man.. .and not the Slave of any one within this said Majesty’s 
Dominions”.50 Regardless of whether Elden was free before the incident, his actions 
earned him the respect of his white crewmates, and the corresponding testimony 
afforded him greater protection against enslavement in the Caribbean.
Scholars have written extensively on the social dynamics of those engaged in 
privateering and piracy. Privateers historically had some maritime training or 
practical skill that enabled them to work aboard ships. In the 1720s the demographic 
shifted, as many wealthier privateers accepted pardons and assimilated back into 
society. Poorer privateers had fewer options. Some were runaway slaves, or slaves 
hired out to the ships by their masters, and the prospect of returning to slavery inspired 
these individuals to continue pirating.51 Others were men pressed into service off of 
captured merchant vessels who discovered some degree of increased freedom or social 
mobility within the pirate crew. Even those pressed from the navy sometimes opted to 
remain, as conditions were sometimes preferable aboard the privateering vessel. 
Excepting Africans seized as cargo by some pirates, pressed members of the crew had 
a say in group decisions and claimed a cut of the lucrative prizes.52
50 Correspondence between John Dart and Janies Glen, July 3, 1747. SCDAH.
51 Bolster, Black Jacks, 137-39.
52 Rediker, Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, 260-68, appendix C l. Rediker’s table o f merchant shipping 
wages from 1730-1750 demonstrates the significant increase in merchant wages throughout the 1740s. 
Rediker argues, and Admiralty Court records verify, that some of this increase is due to the destruction 
of shipping competition through privateering. Rediker uses these statistics to argue that merchant ships 
were also involved in privateering; in this paper they are more useful in providing evidence for 
continued demand for mariners in the time period.
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The privateering demographics in 1740 skewed towards the poorer sailors for 
two major reasons. Jobs aboard merchant vessels were plentiful in the shipping boom, 
and an influx of mariners into Charleston resulted in a prime market for privateers. 
Secondly, the indebted poor were willing to enter the dangerous profession of 
privateering for the chance to pay their debts and secure their business or land. The 
latter issue demarcates the 1740s situation from the post-Spanish Succession piracy 
boom. The economic conditions in South Carolina coupled with the Austrian conflict 
afforded poor privateers the opportunity to make some money through capturing 
prizes with little chance of government action against them.
A combination of local developments and international conflicts set the stage 
for a resurgence in plunder trade in Charleston. The issue of privateering brought 
local economic pressures to the surface. With the pre-war debt touching most of the 
domestic economy, upper and lower classes alike looked to the black market to 
provide financial relief. Just as Thomas Jolly saw privateering, and pirating booty, as 
a mechanism for obtaining freedom, so too did Mrs. Robinson view it as a method for 
obtaining much-needed specie. Charleston’s two most pervasive points of debate, 
economic depression and unfree labor, were resolved between these two parties.
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Conclusion: Competing Definitions, Competing Authorities
Whether Thomas Jolly and Mrs. Robinson violated the law in their agreement 
would depend on which law, and which enforcement institution, was involved, 
invoked, and respected. The colonial officials saw nothing wrong with the 
transaction: Jolly had simply bought out his indenture, fulfilling the terms of the 
contract, and Mrs. Robinson received due value in exchange for the loss of her 
laborer. The vice admiralty could have had both parties on trial, for the booty Jolly 
exchanged for his freedom had not been processed through the proper channels as 
outlined by maritime law, and statutes afforded the court the ability to charge Mrs. 
Robinson as a conspirator.
During the War of Austrian Succession, the vice admiralty continued to 
actively condemn prizes and distributed plunder according to regulation. The typical 
register of a ship brought before the vice-admiralty court contained the name, size, and 
weight of the ship, the cargo, and listed the owners and masters of the ship. 
Considering the regulations, it is clear why men like Jolly, low-ranking and desperate, 
preferred to section off the booty before, or instead of, the vice-admiralty court 
division.
Still, Jolly and men like him didn’t stash, hide, or lie about the origins of the 
plunder. Jolly involved local officials in negotiating the payoff to Mrs. Robinson. 
Similarly, John Ferguson explicitly stated in a will that his investor was entitled to his
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plunder. Colonial authorities were complicit in the plunder trade. Instances such as 
the testimony of Robert Pratt and William Maxwell, and William Dunbar’s self- 
defense claims, suggest that the vice admiralty court still had jurisdiction, and 
theoretical ability, to adjudicate these cases, and that colonists were aware of their 
authority.
“Aware o f’ and “accepting o f ’ proved far apart in the backroom dealings in 
plunder in Charleston, and on the floor of the Commons House. Charleston residents 
consistently challenged the authority of the vice admiralty court between 1720 and 
1755, but they were not in a state of revolutionary rebellion. The steady string of 
appeals to the Privy Council and petitions to Parliament suggest that the colonists 
hoped for an internal remedy to their problems with the vice admiralty court. But 
sustained disdain for the court broke down its practical authority, while panic over 
economic depression and slave revolts led Charleston to question imperial interests in 
what they considered their own affairs. The court had alienated local residents and 
Parliament had not intervened on behalf of the colonists.
The combined effect of internal crisis and colonial-imperial tension was a grey 
zone in which colonial politicians could assert practical control and privateers could 
pirate goods. Instead of challenging the laws on the divergence principle, politicians 
and privateers avoided the court altogether. The extralegal space in which Thomas 
Jolly and Benjamin Elden operated was an opportunity fixed by domestic and 
international conflict, and sustained by popular and local official support.
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London learned from the conflicting opinions of the major legal bodies during 
the War of Austrian Succession. By the time the Seven Years War broke out in 1756, 
the vice admiralty satellite courts received an effective ally in the appointed prize 
agents, who also ordered and oversaw aggressive vessel registration within the ports. 
Colonial officials were supportive of these strategies; in their eyes, finally Parliament 
had sent parties to assist and report on the vice admiralty courts. This new practice 
became so entrenched in maritime governance proceedings that the colonists would 
employ a nearly identical one against the British during the American Revolution.
i
Colonial complicity with British imperial institutions was situational in 
Charleston. In the first half of the eighteenth century, local government enjoyed the 
respect of its citizens during the drive toward stability. Faced with prolonged 
economic and political unrest, the constituency grew increasingly skeptical of British 
understanding of their interests and situations. From this dissatisfaction sprouted 
contests for authority. Charleston’s citizens were always willing to utilize proper 
chains of communication to voice their complaints, but they were also prepared to 
follow a different authority, that of the planter-merchant bloc which supported locally- 
popular but imperially-forbidden policies relating to trade, money, and security. The 
vice admiralty court could not compete in the cycle of practicing power. The bloc had 
earned the authority to override the word of the law, and by permitting technically- 
illegal activity, strengthened their popularity and, in turn, authority. The power of the 
local governance lay in its participants’ ability to open and close windows of
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opportunity strategically, taking action when their political needs and public demand 
aligned against the Crown’s wishes and in favor of divergence.
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